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'Dark matter': institutional constraints and the failure of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Germany
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. 
 
Abstract 
The article is built on four propositions.  First, that there is a latent potential within 
the German polity for the mobilisation of what remains a significant level of popular 
unease about aspects of the ongoing process of European integration.  Second, that at 
present this potential is unfulfilled and, as a result, Euroscepticism remains the ‘dark 
matter’ of German politics.  Third, that the absence of a clearly stated Eurosceptical 
agenda is not due to the inherent ‘enlightenment’ of the German political class about 
the European project, but rather is the result of systemic disincentives shaping the 
preferences of rational acting politicians.  Finally, that these systemic disincentives 
are to be found within the formal institutions of the German polity.  The article posits 
the ideas of ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ Eurosceptical narratives, sustained versus heresthetic 
agendas, and ‘polis constraining’ versus ‘polis shaping’ strategies for their 
promotion.  The article argues that political agents’ choice of strategy depends on the 
nature of the institutional setting within which they are operating.  The article 
concludes by arguing that the institutional configuration of the Federal Republic 
provides poor returns for party-based Euroscepticism, and that the mobilisation of 
popular unease about aspects of European integration remains an unattractive option 
for rational acting political agents. 
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Euroscepticism - the 'dark matter' of German politics 
 
At first glance, this article is an exercise in counter-factual argument.  In seeking to 
explain the impact of institutional settings upon party-based strategies of 
Euroscepticism in the Federal Republic of Germany, one is not trying to describe the 
existence of a political phenomena but, rather, to account for its apparent absence.  On 
the face of it, this would appear to be a difficult task.  Political elites in the Federal 
Republic of Germany have always considered their country to be the Musterknabe 
(model boy) of the European Union.  In no other large member state has the elite 
consensus around the European project been so stable.  Even in France - the other 
motor of integration - there have been elite conflicts over the limits of political and 
economic integration, most notably within the Gaullist Right.  Germany, by contrast, 
has enjoyed decades of cross-party consensus with regard to the desirability of pooled 
political sovereignty and increased economic interdependence.  The stability of this 
consensus has been enhanced by a compliant media, a relatively pro-European mood 
amongst the general public, benign institutions and norms of governance (multi-level 
governance analogous to the EU, a traditional wariness of populist politics amongst 
elites, and constitutional constraints on the use of plebiscites and referenda), as well 
as an open economy that has made the most of the opportunities presented by the 
Common Market and Single Market programmes. 
 
Nevertheless, the potential exists for the emergence of a more 'sceptical' European 
agenda in the Federal Republic of Germany.  There are two sources of evidence for 
this.  The first is elite opinion itself.  The consensus that coalesced around Germany's 
European policy has never been complete and is currently under some pressure.  Elite 
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opinion remains broadly pro-European but German unification, and the changes it has 
brought, have strained the cross-party consensus.  On the Left, the Social Democratic 
SPD flirted briefly with a more sceptical approach to Europe in the mid-1990s, whilst 
the post-Communist PDS remains hostile to many fundamental aspects of the 
integration process (the Greens, by contrast, have become very pro-EU over the 
course of the 1990s).  On the Right, the Christian Democratic CDU remains pro-EU 
but its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, has resisted some elements of the integration 
process (Bavaria has been proactive in forging cross-party alliances at the state level 
in order to defend its interests and has also developed links with Jörg Haider's 
People's Party in neighbouring Austria).  Thus, the stakes surrounding elite debate 
have been raised. 
 
The second source of evidence is that of public opinion.  Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer's 2000 'Berlin Speech', and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's more recent 
endorsement of an internal SPD discussion paper on political union, are evidence that 
Germany remains at the vanguard of the push for further integration.  However, the 
Schröder initiative in particular was seen in Germany as just as much an attempt to 
neutralise 'Europe' as an issue in the run-up to the 2002 Bundestag elections [Der 
Spiegel. 07/05/01], as it was a genuine contribution to the ongoing debate on political 
structures preceding the next EU Intergovernmental Conference in 2004. 
 
The fact that the Schröder initiative was regarded as partly an election ploy is 
indicative of the manner in which the state of public opinion has become more salient 
in the last few years.  Until the late 1990s, public opinion towards the broad idea of 
European integration remained relatively supportive, at around the average level for 
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EU states [Eurobarometer. No. 50].  However this level of support is now a thing of 
the past, with recent polling indicating that support for the principle of European 
integration has fallen to about 10 per cent below the EU average [Eurobarometer. No. 
53].  Moreover, when one 'unpacks' the issue of European integration, it is clear that 
public unease focuses on certain elements of the integration process.  In particular, 
there is great unease about the replacement of the strong D-mark by the Euro.  
Popular opposition to the single currency is stable and entrenched: ever since the 
1970s, roughly two-thirds of the German population have opposed the idea of 
monetary union [Bulmer and Paterson, 1987; Rheinhardt, 1997].  More recently the 
enlargement of the European Union has also become a moot point.  Although there is 
majority support for the broad principle of eastern enlargement, support drops to only 
30 per cent when averaged out on a country-by-country basis [Eurobarometer. No. 
54]. 
 
Given that the D-mark has become a symbol of Germany's post-war achievements, it 
perhaps not surprising that the public remain uneasy about its abolition.  What is more 
noteworthy is the failure of any of the Federal Republic's mainstream parties to 
mobilise around this hostility in a consistent manner.  Instead of an emerging 
Eurosceptical agenda, polling indicates that there is now a clearly defined, and 
entrenched disjuncture between elite and popular opinion
2
.  One could argue that such 
a disjuncture is not unusual in the Federal Republic and that, in a polity where an 
incumbent government has only once been removed at the ballot box, elites have 
found it relatively easy to resist the siren call of populist politics when it suits them.  
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Euroscepticism is the 'dark matter' of German 
politics - seen through the lens of the party politics literature, it is to all intents and 
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purposes invisible, but opinion poll data confirms that it is there.  So why has it not 
found an effective political voice within the political mainstream? 
 
 
 
Aims and Structure 
 
The article aims to account for the lack of a strong Eurosceptic agenda in Germany to 
date, as well as to provide some pointers as to where such an agenda might have been 
expected to emerge.  Much has been written about the German ideological 
commitment to European integration [Rheinhardt, 1997; Paterson, W.E., 1996; Peters, 
2001], and it is not necessary to repeat such arguments here.  By contrast, the article 
looks beyond the role of ideology.  It takes a rational actor approach, works from the 
assumption that German politicians are as opportunistic as any others, and argues that, 
rather than looking to the 'enlightenment' of the German political class on European 
matters, the lack of strong party-based Eurosceptic agendas can be explained by 
reference to the pattern of institutional constraints found in the Federal Republic.  In 
other words, the coercive, normative and informational variables within the political 
institutions of the Federal Republic - what Kitschelt [1986] calls its political 
opportunity structure - have, up to now, made the pursuit of a Eurosceptical agenda 
difficult, unrewarding and, for instrumental politicians, an irrational course of action. 
 
The article is structured as follows.  In the next section, the article's theoretical 
grounding is set out - including a discussion as to how we can categorise Eurosceptic 
narratives, the types of agendas that harness these narratives, and why institutions 
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determine the kind of strategies adopted to promote such agendas.  Following on from 
this, the core of the article is given over to an analysis of the specific institutional 
settings in the Federal Republic of Germany and their impact upon party-based 
Euroscepticism.  Finally, the article concludes with an assessment of the prospects for 
what remains at present a disparate opposition to the European project. 
 
 
 
Theory 
 
Institutional settings 
As already noted, the article assumes that the institutional setting of the Federal 
Republic of Germany is crucial to the success or failure of party based 
Euroscepticism.  But what, in the context of this argument, constitutes an institution?  
One useful starting point is Hall's structuralist definition of institutions which, he 
argues, includes 'the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating 
practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the 
polity and economy' [Hall, 1986: p. 19].  This approach is echoed by Ikenberry, who 
argues that institutions operate on three levels: ranging 'from specific characteristics 
of government institutions, to the more overarching structures of the state, to the 
nation's normative social order' [Ikenberry, 1988: pp. 222-3].  Game theorists, on the 
other hand, tend to take a minimalist approach to institutions; for instance Riker 
regards them as little more than 'congealed tastes' [Riker, 1980], whilst Ostrom 
describes them as simply 'prescriptions' about the permissibility of actions in a given 
setting [Ostrom, 1986]. 
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As also noted, the article takes a rational actor approach.  In principle this means that 
it is assumed that politicians are instrumental utility maximisers rather than cultural 
dupes.  However, in recent years the new institutionalist literature has seen some 
blurring of the 'utility maximiser/cultural dupe' divide
3
, and even the most entrenched 
rational choice theorist would accept that institutions do constitute significant 
constraints on instrumental action.  In other words, institutions provide the arenas 
within which political agency is practised and they are more than just passive settings 
for such agency.  The article would not go as far as arguing that institutions 'are 
political actors in their own right' [March and Olsen, 1984: p. 738], but does argue 
that they constitute a series of veto points on political agency, often forcing politicians 
to adopt 'satisficing' strategies [Simon, 1957], in which the 'best' option is eschewed 
for one that is 'good enough'.  Thus, institutions curb the behaviour of politicians: 
privileging path-dependent strategies which, in the context of the article, tend to be 
ones that re-enforce the dominant pro-European consensus.  The nature and scope of 
these institutions can be placed on a continuum, ranging from formal legally-codified 
practices through to more inchoate organisational networks and norms.  However, the 
article will concentrate upon the more formal institutions, and the practices and norms 
associated with them. 
 
Polis-constraining and polis-shaping strategies 
This focus on formal institutions is compatible with the article's assumption that 
politicians are instrumental agents.  For conventional political entrepreneurs working 
within political parties, the arenas for political agency remain the core institutions of 
the formal polity.  Moreover, the pattern of constraints within these core institutions 
will determine the kind of political strategies adopted by political agents. 
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These strategies can be classified as either 'polis-constraining' or 'polis-shaping' in 
nature.  This dichotomy builds upon the work of Alfred Stepan, whose framework for 
the comparative analysis of federal systems places them along a 'demos-constraining-
demos-enabling' continuum [Stepan, 2001].  Stepan's framework analyses federal 
systems as institutional settings.  However, because of the article's concentration on 
party political agency within these institutional settings, I have adapted Stepan's 
terminology in order to shift the focus away from the demos (the enfranchised 
population with the polity) and more on the polis (the organised expression of 
political interests within the demos).  Thus, polis-constraining strategies are those that 
attempt to constrain the central polity from without.  In other words, political agents 
use the demos constraining nature of German federalism as a resource, in order to try 
and modify, slow, or - if possible - veto integrationist policy initiatives promoted by 
the pro-European majority that dominate the national level of politics.  To this, I have 
added the second category of polis-shaping strategies, which are adopted within 
institutions where it is possible to shape or shift the parameters of power and 
discourse at the centre from within - in other words, to modify, slow, or veto 
integrationist initiatives by engaging with the pro-European majority directly at the 
national level. 
 
Table 1, below, sums up how the new 'polis-constraining-polis-shaping' dichotomy 
maps onto the institutions of the Federal Republic.  Subsequent segments of the article 
demonstrate how either polis-constraining or polis-shaping strategies are more 
appropriate to particular institutional settings (and how such settings differ in the 
extent to which they facilitate or constrain party-based Eurosceptic agendas). 
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Table 1:  Institutional settings and political strategies in the Federal Republic of 
Germany 
Strategy Institutional setting 
Polis-constraining German system of federalism, including 
the division of competencies between the 
Federation and the Länder, Bundestag-
Bundesrat relations and state-level 
coalitions. 
Polis-shaping Federal party system, including the role 
of multi-party systems, proportional 
representation, political competition and 
election outcomes (coalition 
government). 
 
 
Agendas and agents 
Having established the kind of strategies that are appropriate to particular institutional 
settings, it is necessary to differentiate between the types of agendas that these 
strategies are designed to promote and the status of the political agents that promote 
them.  In terms of agendas, one must make a distinction between sustained agendas - 
that are developed across time and often space and reflect the core values of those that 
promote them - and what Riker [1982] calls heresthetics.  Heresthetic agendas are 
exercises in political manipulation designed to change the balance of political forces 
to the advantage of the heresthetician, by introducing a new dimension of issue 
salience into the political game.  This is not to say that such agendas are always 
insincere or are never grounded in core beliefs, but rather that their salience at a given 
time and place is a means to an end rather than an end in itself.  Thus, in terms of 
Euroscepticism, sustained agendas are those that are more or less consistently held 
across time and space and reflect a set of stable preferences concerning European 
integration, whilst heresthetic agendas are limited to particular 'issues' and reflect less 
stable preferences or even indifference to the issue. 
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Following on from this, the type of agenda chosen by political agents is dependent on 
the agents' resource status within a given institutional setting - in other words, the 
resources agents have in their possession relative to their opponents.  Having said this, 
however, there is no clear pattern between agendas and relative resource status.  
Sustained agendas may be pursued by agents, regardless of status, whilst heresthetic 
agendas may be indicative of relative strength (the ability to introduce a new 
dimension into the political game) or weakness (the need to do so).  In the context of 
the article, the status of agents is determined by, first, whether they are political 
parties per se or smaller factions within parties and, second, the strength of their 
territorial base.  This is discussed at greater length later in the article. 
 
Defining Euroscepticism 
Finally, it is necessary to unpack the narrative of Euroscepticism that informs the 
agendas described above.  The use of the phrase 'Euroscepticism' is problematic.  It is 
a self-ascribed categorisation that entered the political discourse towards the end of 
the 1980s and gained popular recognition during the Maastricht Treaty ratification 
process in the UK in the early 1990s [see Milner, 2000: p. 1-3].  As a result, not only 
is it not a social scientific term, but it is also rather 'Brito-centric'. 
 
Nevertheless, when it was coined the term was an accurate description of the public 
pronouncements of those British politicians who identified themselves as 
Eurosceptics.  These individuals were to be found mainly on the Right of the 
Conservative party (in particular, those associated with the Bruges group of 
Thatcherite MPs) and, to a lesser extent, what remained of the 'Bennite' left of the 
Labour party.  However as the Conservative party drifted rightwards during the 
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1990s, the issue-salience of 'Europe' rose significantly and, as the Right grew in 
confidence, the discourse of Euroscepticism became one of outright Europhobia in 
many quarters.  At the same time, there remains a body of genuinely 'sceptical' MPs in 
all of the major parties.  Moreover, many political parties - and factions of political 
parties - across Europe display some degree of hostility to the integration project, 
albeit differentiated in terms of content and tone.  It is clear that Euroscepticism per se 
is no longer a sufficient descriptive category and needs to be differentiated. 
 
In recent years, a substantial literature has emerged examining the basis and extent of 
Euroscepticism in EU member states
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.  The approach and scope of this work is 
heterogeneous, but a common theme throughout is that the configuration of party 
politics in specific member states goes a long way to determining the 'spread' of party 
positions on Europe within each state.  Taggart and Szczerbiak continue this party 
politics focus and come to a number of explicit theoretical positions on 
Euroscepticism.  They start from a basic description of Euroscepticism as 'the idea of 
contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified 
opposition to the process of European integration', and then develop a binary division 
between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism.  'Hard' Euroscepticism is defined as the 
outright rejection of the integration project in its current form and opposition to their 
country joining, or remaining in the EU, whilst 'soft' Euroscepticism is contingent or 
qualified opposition.  The authors then go on to further differentiate between two 
types of 'soft' Euroscepticism: that of 'policy' and 'national interest' Euroscepticism.  
Policy-based Euroscepticism is compatible with overall support for European 
integration, but focuses on opposition to the extension of EU competencies in specific 
policy domains.  National-interest Euroscepticism is also compatible with overall 
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support for European integration, but involves the use of rhetoric defending the 
national interest in order to shore up domestic support bases [Taggart and Szczerbiak, 
2001: pp. 5-6]. 
 
For the purposes of the article, the Taggart/Szczerbiak typology's focus on party 
politics and division between 'soft' and 'hard' variants of Euroscepticism works well as 
a robust and intuitively plausible basis for analysis.  However, the further division 
between 'policy' and 'national-interest' forms of soft Euroscepticism is superfluous.  
There are three reasons for this.  First, the rhetorical use of the national interest in 
order to shore up domestic support is part of the basic toolkit of any serious politician 
- even the arch-integrationist Helmut Kohl resorted to it from time to time (for 
instance, during negotiations on the remit of the European Central Bank in the mid-
1990s).  In fact, it would be hard to find a prominent politician who has not indulged 
in this type of rhetoric (which would be better described as an example of the 
heresthetic agendas described in the previous section).  Second, having discounted 
national interest rhetoric, I would suggest that all substantive objections to EU 
integration that fall short of 'hard' Euroscepticism are, in practice, objections about 
policy.  These may be broad-brush objections about policy processes (such as the 
breadth and scope of EU competencies) and objectives (for instance, the overall shape 
of the EU's political economy, or its international role), or they may focus on more 
specific policy domains (such as Justice and Home Affairs, or Environmental policy).  
Nevertheless, they are policy-oriented objections that are qualified rather than 
absolute and, therefore, resolvable through negotiation at the inter-governmental 
level.  Therefore, they remain compatible with the spirit of the EU project (although it 
is possible that too many policy-specific objections would make a nominal 
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commitment to EU integration unworkable in practice).  Finally, if one accepts that 
the division between the 'national-interest' and 'policy' strands of 'soft' Euroscepticism 
is contested and not absolutely essential, it should be discarded on the grounds that it 
compounds the perennial comparative politics problem of 'too many variables and too 
few cases'.  That being said, however, the simplified Taggart/Szczerbiak model can be 
adapted to provide three robust categories on which one can map the positions of 
political parties in Germany.  These are set out in Table 2, below. 
 
Table 2: A Typology of Party Positions on European Integration in the Federal 
Republic of Germany 
 
European Consensus 
 
'Soft' Euroscepticism 
 
'Hard' Euroscepticism 
Greens
5
 
SPD 
FDP 
CDU/CSU
6
 
PDS
7
 
Elements of SPD left 
National-Liberal FDP 
Elements of CDU right 
CSU state party 
DVU/NPD/Reps. 
 
 
The first, and dominant, category is that of the pro-European consensus, 
encompassing all of the mainstream parties at the Federal level of party politics.  The 
second category is that of 'soft' Euroscepticism and encompasses the PDS, elements of 
the SPD's left-wing, the 'national-liberal' faction within the centrist FDP, parts of the 
CDU's right-wing, and the dominant faction in the state party organisation of the 
CDU's sister party the CSU (led by Minister-President Edmund Stoiber).  Finally, the 
third category encompasses the three far right parties, the DVU, NPD and Republican 
party.  Because of these parties' low level of support, and pariah status within the 
party system, this third category is less important than that of 'soft' Euroscepticism. 
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German federalism as an institutional setting 
 
German Federalism in a comparative context 
German federalism shares six institutional characteristics with other modern 
federations, such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Switzerland.  First, in all 
of these states, there are at least two constitutionally-protected tiers of government, 
acting directly on the people.  Second, the allocation of jurisdiction and resources to 
the tiers is constitutionally-codified.  Third, where overlaps of constitutional 
jurisdiction exist, 'federal comity' is preserved through provisions for shared rule.  
Fourth, the composition and practices of central institutions include some degree of 
constitutionally protected representation of regional and minority views.  Fifth, any 
amendment of the constitution requires the endorsement of a stated proportion of the 
governments or electorates of the constituent units.  Finally, in each of the constituent 
parts of the federation, there is an 'umpire' to adjudicate on constitutional matters (in 
Germany, this is the Federal Constitutional Court) [Jeffery and Savigear, 1991: p. 28]. 
 
However, all federations are not the same.  Riker dichotomises federal systems into 
'decentralised federalism' versus 'centralised federalism' [Riker, 1964].  However, as 
already noted, for the purposes of the article Stepan's 'demos constraining-demos 
enabling' continuum is a more fruitful source of differentiation as it encompasses the 
idea of federalism as both an institutional restraint upon, and facilitator of, political 
agency. 
 
Stepan starts from the assumption that 'all democratic federations, qua federations, are 
centre constraining'.  There are four reasons for this.  First, as noted above, 
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federations are characterised by constitutional checks and balances that protect the 
powers of the constituent units against the centre.  Therefore, the centre must accept 
that some issue areas are constitutionally beyond its jurisdiction.  Second, the 
existence of constitutionally protected sub-national tiers of government means that the 
demos is diffused into multiple demoi and divided into multiple authority structures.  
Third, federal constitutions require a certain level of assent from the constituent parts 
before amendment is possible (remembering that the hardest rules to change are 
decision rules that require a positive vote from those who nevertheless benefit from 
the status quo).  Finally, as a corollary to the previous three factors, federal 
constitutions are, as a rule, more complex than those of unitary states.  As a result, 
they tend to privilege the importance of the judiciary as an arbitrator of boundary 
disputes and enhance its status as a political actor in its own right [Stepan, 2001: pp. 
335-6]. 
 
If these four factors inherent to federalism are demos constraining, it follows that 
political agents can use federalism as a platform for strategies that attempt to 
constrain organised political interests within the demos.  Not only, as Tarrow 
observes, do 'decentralised states provide a multitude of targets at the base' [Tarrow, 
1994: p. 81] of the polity for agents opposed to the central polis, they also provide 
constitutionally-protected and independently-resourced platforms from which to 
launch more formal and institutionalised strategies of opposition [Lees, 2001a].  In 
other words, they potentially encourage polis-constraining strategies, including 
Eurosceptic strategies. 
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How demos-constraining is German Federalism? 
Nevertheless, the question remains as to what extent does the specifically German 
system of federalism provide such a potential for opposition.  The first step to 
answering this is to establish where the Federal Republic is placed along Stepan's 
demos constraining-demos enabling continuum.  Stepan operationalises his 
continuum by mapping the institutional characteristics of a number of modern 
federations (including the United States, Brazil, India, Austria, Belgium and 
Germany) onto four key variables, each of which comes with an a priori proposition 
about its demos-constraining qualities.  These are set out in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3:  Stepan's Four 'Demos Constraining - Demos Enabling' Variables 
[2001: pp. 340-1]. 
Variable 1: The degree of overrepresentation in the territorial chamber. 
Proposition: The greater the overrepresentation of the less populous states (and 
thus the underrepresentation of the more populous states) the greater 
the demos-constraining potential of the territorial chamber. 
Variable 2: The 'policy scope' of the territorial chamber. 
Proposition: The greater the 'policy scope' of the chamber that represents the 
principle of territory, the greater the potential  to limit the lawmaking 
powers of the chamber that represents the population. 
Variable 3: The degree to which policy making is constitutionally allocated to 
super majorities or to subunits of the federation. 
Proposition: The greater the amount of policy making competencies that are 
constitutionally prescribed as requiring super majorities or as being 
beyond the lawmaking powers of the central government, the greater 
the demos is constrained. 
Variable 4: The degree to which the party system is politywide in its orientation 
and incentive systems. 
Proposition: The more political parties are disciplined parties whose incentive 
systems, especially concerning nominations, privileges politywide 
interests over provincial and local interests, the more politywide 
parties can mitigate the inherent demos limiting characteristics of 
federalism. 
 
Overall, Stepan places Germany's system of federalism around the middle of his 
comparative ranking.  In terms of the first variable, the degree of overrepresentation 
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of the territorial chamber, the least overrepresented system is Belgium (with a Gini-
coefficient of overrpresentation of 0.015), whilst the most overrepresented is Brazil 
(with a coefficient of 0.52).  Germany, by contrast has a coefficient of 0.32 [Stepan, 
2001: p. 342].  Nevertheless, Germany's middle-ranking still represents a significant 
degree of territorial overrepresentation.  Under the 1949 Basic Law (amended after 
Unification), all German states have between three and six votes in the second 
chamber, the Bundesrat.  The two most populous states, North-Rhine Westphalia 
(population: 17.8 million) and Bavaria (11.9 million), have only six votes whilst, at 
the other end of the scale the city-states of Hamburg (1.7 million) and Bremen (0.7 
million) have three votes.  This is quite a high degree of territorial overrepresentation 
and its demos constraining potential is considerable. 
 
In terms of the second variable, the degree of 'policy scope' of the second chamber, 
the Bundesrat's competencies are fairly modest.  Unlike the United States, where the 
principle of 'symmetry of policy scope' has often led to legislative gridlock, the 
German system of federalism accords the Bundesrat much less policy scope - 
although this has changed recently.  In the early years of the Federal Republic, only 
40 per cent of Bundestag legislation required Bundesrat assent, but this rose to around 
60 per cent in the 1990s.  Moreover, much of this increased legislative consent ratio 
was the result of concessions won by the German states during the Maastricht Treaty 
ratification process.  Bundesrat consent is now required when European legislation 
impacts on those policy competencies reserved for the constituent states, such as 
Education and Science [Jeffery, 1994].  In addition to these enhanced 'European' 
powers, the tendency in recent years for there to be divided majorities in the two 
chambers has increased the importance of the Bundesrat's power of 'suspensive veto', 
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which forces contested legislation to be considered by a joint committee drawn from 
the two chambers
8
. 
 
Ranking of countries according to the third variable, the degree to which policy 
making is constitutionally allocated to supermajorities or to subunits of the federation, 
also places Germany about half-way along the demos constraining-demos enabling 
continuum.  However, analysis of this variable yields an interesting dichotomy.  On 
the one hand, Article 31 of the Basic Law states that 'Federal law shall take 
precedence over Land law', which means that, in terms of lawmaking power, the 
central demos is far less constrained in Germany than it is in, for instance, the United 
States.  On the other hand, whereas in the United States many federal programmes are 
administered by federal employees, the vast majority of German federal programmes 
are administered by Länder officials [Stepan, 2001: pp. 352-3].  This implementation 
function provides another set of veto points that potentially constrain the majoritarian 
pro-European consensus and provide a platform for alternative agendas. 
 
Finally, in terms of Stepan's final variable, the degree to which the party system is 
polity-wide in its orientation and incentive systems, Germany ranks highly.  This 
means that, compared with other federations such as Brazil, India, and the USA, 
Germany's party system displays strong centralising tendencies.  Politywide parties 
control almost all of the seats in the two chambers and exert a high degree of party 
discipline over their members.  Thus, ceteris paribus, the configuration of the German 
party system is not particularly demos constraining - although in recent years it has 
become more constrained as the Bundesrat has increasingly used its suspensive veto 
over Bundestag legislation [Stepan, 2001: p. 358]. 
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German Federalism as a platform for Eurosceptic strategies 
 
So what does Germany's ranking along Stepan's demos constraining-demos enabling 
continuum tell us about the potential of German federalism as a platform for polis-
constraining strategies of party based Euroscepticism?  Here it is helpful to return to 
Taggart and Szczerbiak's distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' Eurosceptic narratives. 
 
Discounting hard Euroscepticism 
As already noted, the party political champions of hard Euroscepticism are located on 
the far right of the political spectrum and are not represented in the Bundestag.  All 
three far right parties have been reasonably successful in gaining representation at the 
lowest levels of German governance, those of the Kommune and Gemeinde, but 
political activity at this level has little or no outside impact and is of no use in terms of 
agenda-setting.  By contrast the Land level is a much more effective arena for 
political action, not least because of Land governments' direct input into national 
politics through the Bundesrat.  However,  where far right parties have entered Land 
legislatures (such as in West Berlin in 1989, when the Republicans gained 7.5 per cent 
of the vote and 11 seats in the state legislature), they have been shunned by the other 
parties [Lees, 2000].  As a result, far right parties have never had the opportunity to 
actively shape the political agenda at any significant level of governance in the 
Federal Republic.  Indeed, it might even be argued - although it would be hard to 
demonstrate this - that the far right's anti-EU stance discredits Euroscepticism by 
association.  At the very least, the far right is largely irrelevant to mainstream politics 
in the Federal Republic and, as a result, it is safe to assume that there is little scope for 
popular mobilisation around such a hard Eurosceptic narrative. 
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Differentiating Soft Euroscepticism 
But what of those political agendas that harness a form of soft Euroscepticism?  Here 
it is necessary to return to the two distinctions made earlier in the article about 
agendas and agents.  In terms of agendas, the article differentiates between sustained 
Eurosceptical agendas, which have developed over time, and heresthetic agendas, 
built around a specific issue and limited to time and place.  In terms of agents, the key 
issues are whether, first, agents are Eurosceptic political parties or just sceptical 
factions within otherwise Euro-orthodox parties and, second, the degree to which 
agents are able to harness the territorial dimension of German federalism as a 
platform (in other words, how well embedded are they within Land government).  
Some examples of how this maps onto the institutional setting of German federalism 
are set out in summary form in Table 4, below. 
 
Table 4: Examples of party-based Eurosceptical agendas, and territorial 
embeddedness 
Party United? Faction? Sustained? Heresthetic? Territory? 
 
PDS Yes  Yes  Yes 
(various) 
SPD Yes   Yes Yes 
(Baden-
Württemberg) 
CDU  Yes  Yes Yes 
(Saxony) 
CSU  Yes Yes  Yes 
(Bavaria) 
 
Given that this segment of the article is focused on the Federal dimension as an 
institutional setting for party-based Euroscepticism, some degree of territorial 
embeddedness is taken as a given and is present in all of the examples.  However, 
what is clear from a far from exhaustive set of examples is that there is no clear link 
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between the resource status of political agents and the type of Eurosceptic agenda 
being promoted.  The article now examines these examples in more detail. 
 
Sustained agenda/united party 
The only united party that has consistently developed a sustained critique of the 
European consensus is the post-communist PDS.  The PDS has been a consistent 
critic of both the terms and, on occasion, the principle of the EMU project.  More 
recently, attempts by the EU to forge a common position on European defence and 
security has led to the PDS adopting consistently 'sceptical' positions on issues such as 
participation by the German military in out-of-area operations, and outright operation 
to the EU's position on the Kosovo crisis and US action in Afghanistan. 
 
It is clear that the territorial dimension of German federalism has been central to the 
party's ability to carve out its own distinctive position on Europe.  The PDS is the 
fourth biggest party in the Bundestag with 35 seats, but this support is almost 
exclusively concentrated in the 'new Federal states' of the former German Democratic 
Republic and strongly reliant on high shares of the vote in the eastern half of Berlin.  
Moreover, under Germany's Additional Member System (AMS) of proportional 
representation, the PDS is highly dependent on directly-elected 'constituency' seats 
(allocated on the number of first votes cast), in addition to the list seats (allocated 
through the second vote) on which the smaller parties in the German party system 
normally rely. 
 
This clear territorial dimension to the PDS' support is reflected in its strength at the 
Land level, where it has consolidated itself as a strong regional party in the new 
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Federal states of eastern Germany [Lees, 1995: pp. 150-54], to the extent that support 
for the PDS in some areas is well in excess of 30 per cent [McKay, 2000: pp. 123-
138].  As a result, the PDS has become a significant player in subnational 
government.  By the mid-1990s, the party had taken on a 'kingmaker' function by 
'tolerating' the formation of a Red-Green coalition in the state of Saxony-Anhalt and, 
for a brief period in 2001, in Berlin.  Since 1998, it has also been the junior partner in 
coalition with the SPD in Mecklenburg-Pomerania.  This so-called 'Red-Red' coalition 
is regarded by some as the template for other coalitions in the east, most notably in 
the state of Saxony where the PDS are the second strongest party after the CDU [Der 
Spiegel. 14/05/01]. 
 
If the PDS holds its position in the eastern states, it could become a more significant 
player within the central polis.  There are two reasons for this.  First, as Downs 
suggests, there are vertical linkages between national and sub-national governments.  
These are of a two-way nature, with the experience of sub-national government 
arrangements constituting a bottom-up flow of information - a 'feedback' effect - to 
national party elites and providing a template for future coalitions at the national level 
[Downs, 1998: pp. 243-266].  Because of this, sub-national coalitions have indirect 
polis-shaping qualities.  Second, and more significantly, the principle of territorial 
overrepresentation within the Bundesrat provides the potential for a small number of 
PDS-influenced states to wield a disproportionate influence within the second 
chamber and, therefore, exercise constraint on the central polis.  This direct polis-
constraining role could potentially be further enhanced by the delicate balance of 
partisan power within the Bundesrat, which enhances the role of small blocking 
minorities. 
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At the same time, however, there are limits to the PDS' ability to promote a sustained 
agenda of soft Euroscepticism.  Again, there are two reasons for this.  First, even with 
the enhanced European competences enjoyed by the German states, the salience of 
'European' issues at the Land level remains quite low.  It is true that there are certain 
policy domains, such as Education and Science, where the states complain of undue 
interference from the European Union and where they have been successful in getting 
the Federal government to take up these issues on their behalf.  Nevertheless, these 
are not the kind of policy issues that would form the core of a strong challenge to 
existing consensus.  Second, the PDS is not (and will probably never be) in a position 
to govern alone in any of the eastern states.  Therefore, it must go into coalition with 
either the SPD or the CDU and be bound by formal coalition agreements.  Given that, 
as already noted, the composition and performance of state-level coalitions have 
consequences at the Federal level, it is hard to imagine any circumstances in which 
the SPD or CDU would countenance entering into a coalition with the PDS without 
assurances that its junior partner would tone-down its Euroscepticism
9
. 
 
Sustained agenda/party faction 
The other clear example of a sustained agenda of soft Euroscepticism is that 
developed by the dominant faction of the CSU state party in Bavaria.  In terms of 
relative resources, the political agents promoting this agenda are not a united party 
like the PDS.  However, they are equally embedded within the territorial dimension of 
German federalism.  Moreover, because of the CSU's long record in government, they 
also enjoy an 'insider' status that the PDS lacks. 
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At the Federal level, the CDU and CSU operate as effectively a single party, with a 
joint parliamentary faction in the Bundestag.  The CSU's self-ascribed role within this 
arrangement is as a 'conservative corrective' to the both the CDU's moderate wing and 
also, prior to the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition losing power in 1998, to the influence of 
the liberal FDP.  However, the CSU's centre of gravity resides at the state level and 
here the CSU state party articulates a more aggressively 'Bavarian' agenda.  Amongst 
other things, this agenda feeds off the state's sense of 'otherness' within the Federal 
Republic and, as a rich state, resentment at the level of fiscal transfers between rich 
and poor states.  Moreover, in recent years, Minister President Edmund Stoiber has 
reacted to the ongoing Europeanisation of policy-making in the Federal Republic by 
developing a 'Bavarian' position on some of the key areas of the European project.  
This process began in earnest following the post-1989 changes in central and eastern 
Europe, when Bavaria came out clearly in support of the enlargement of the European 
Union.  Bavaria's position was often framed within a discourse that stressed the 
historical and moral responsibility of Germany towards its eastern neighbours.  
However, underlying this were two elements of realpolitik.  The first involved the 
need to stabilise the region and enhance Bavaria's 'security', which the state 
government regarded as threatened by upheaval in the east.  The second element 
involved the issue-linkage of enlargement to reform of the EU itself and, in particular, 
the rolling back of what was seen as Brussels interventionism.  Over the decade, this 
discourse developed to the point that it has been described as 'an anti-interventionist 
position that has come close at times to UK-style Euroscepticism' [Jeffery and 
Collins, 1998: p. 91].  Key positions adopted by Bavaria include a re-emphasis of the 
principle of subsidiarity, reform of the system of structural funds, reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (with a shift from funding production to income support 
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for farmers), and restrictions on the free movement of persons within the Union.  
Taken together, these proposals resemble the paradigm of a 'soft' Eurosceptic 
narrative described by Taggart and Szczerbiak. 
 
Heresthetic agenda/united party 
The most notable example of a united party using soft Euroscepticism as a heresthetic 
took place when the SPD flirted with a more Eurosceptical position in the run-up to 
March 1996 state elections in Baden-Württemberg.  The elections took place during a 
period of high issue-salience for the topic of EMU and, encouraged by opinion poll 
data that showed that as much as 80 per cent of the population harboured doubts about 
the stability of the European currency [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 15/11/95], the 
local SPD attempted to exploit the issue during the election campaign.  In a strategy 
endorsed by the party's national leadership, including Gerhard Schröder and Oskar 
Lafontaine, the state SPD's candidate for Minister-President, Dieter Spöri, likened 
EMU to a programme for committing harakiri!  In particular, he questioned the timing 
and scope of the EMU process, arguing for a delay of at least five years and, in the 
meantime, a re-introduction of narrow currency fluctuation margins within the 
European Monetary System.  On top of these specific proposals, Spöri expressed 
wider doubts about the advisability of going ahead with EMU without all of the major 
EU economies on board and poured scorn on the proposed name of the common 
currency, the Euro, which he said lacked appeal and was evidence of how 
'unprofessionally monetary union had been prepared' [Südwest-Presse 11/01/96]. 
 
Spöri's criticisms of the EMU process were labelled populist by his opponents but, 
nevertheless, many observers believed that the state SPD would benefit from making 
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EMU a campaign issue.  But, in the event, the SPD's share of the vote dropped from 
29.5 per cent in the previous election to 25.1 per cent.  Although it would be hard to 
demonstrate beyond doubt, the only apparent beneficiary of the SPD's campaign was 
the far right Republican party, which gained 9.1 per cent of the vote.  Subsequent 
analysis indicated that the SPD's stance on EMU was regarded as inconsistent and 
opportunistic, and that it was likely that the Republicans, which had consistently 
opposed EMU, benefited from further raising the salience of EMU as an issue 
[Rheinhardt, 1997].  Not surprisingly, since 1996 the SPD has avoided a repeat of the 
Baden-Württemberg heresthetic
10
. 
 
Heresthetic agenda/party faction 
Finally, an example of a faction of an otherwise pro-European party using soft 
Euroscepticism as a heresthetic agenda also took place in 1996 and involved the 
dominant faction of the CDU state party in Saxony.  The catalyst for this heresthetic 
was the decision of the CDU-governed state to grant a subsidy of DM 779 million to 
Volkswagen, which operated a plant in the town of Mosel.  In June 1996, the 
European Commission declared the subsidy illegal under EU competition law, 
prompting Minister President Kurt Biedenkopf to issue a legal challenge to the 
decision
11
.  Although the issue was finally resolved, it generated much resentment 
about a perceived encroachment on the rights of the German states.  Moreover, when 
the terms and conditions of EMU were being ratified by the Bundesrat in 1998, 
Saxony was the only German state that abstained in the vote (all the others voted in 
favour) – indicating that the state government was still smarting from what it regarded 
as interference from Brussels. 
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The heresthetic in this case had four purposes.  First, this controlled burst of anti-EU 
rhetoric was intended to shore-up the position of the CDU in a structurally deprived 
eastern German state, where the sceptical PDS is the second-largest party.  Second, it 
bolstered Biedenkopf's personal power base in the state by re-enforcing his image as 
the 'father of the state' (Landesvater).  Third, it served to put pressure on the 
CDU/CSU-FDP Federal government and highlight the role of the German states in the 
formulation of German policy towards the EU.  Finally, by embarrassing the 
staunchly pro-European Helmut Kohl, Biedenkopf was pursuing a political rivalry 
with the German Chancellor that went back to the CDU's years in opposition during 
the 1970s.  
 
The limits of polis-constraining strategies 
To sum up this section of the article, Stepan's typology of federal systems highlights 
the potential for federal systems to act in a demos constraining manner.  Moreover 
although Germany's system of federalism is not as demos constraining as, for 
example, the US system, it still retains significant demos constraining potential across 
Stepan's four variables.  First, there is a reasonable level of territorial 
overrepresentation in the second chamber, which by definition constrains the central 
demos.  Second, although the Bundesrat has a relatively limited degree of policy 
scope, it has been enhanced in recent years in the very areas that are central to 
developing a Eurosceptic agenda.  Third, although only a modest amount of policy 
making is reserved for sub-units of the federation, the bulk of policy implementation 
is carried out by state-level personnel.  Finally, although the incentive systems of 
political parties are generally federation-wide, state parties do enjoy a certain amount 
of political leeway.  This is particularly true of the Bavarian CSU, where it is the state 
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party, rather than the Bundestag parliamentary group, which is the core ideological 
and resource base of the party. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the examples described above, as yet the Federal dimension has 
not proved an effective platform for a coherent challenge to the pro-European 
consensus.  So why is this the case?  Somewhat trivially, one could point to the irony 
that, in practice, the principle of territorial overrepresentation actually works against 
such an agenda, given that Bavaria - the most Eurosceptic state - is also a large state 
and therefore relatively underrepresented.  More seriously, one could point to the gulf 
in economic development between eastern states like Saxony and wealthy Bavaria, 
which makes the formulation of a common position an uphill battle.  Thus, although 
both states have been critical of the European Union, Saxony wants an increase in 
some aspects of Brussels' role – most notably through an increase in its share of 
structural funds – while Bavaria wants to reduce it. 
 
That being said, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the key factor in this equation 
remains that of party politics.  By their very nature, sustained challenges to the pro-
European consensus must be mounted from 'outsider' positions away from the 
political centre, towards the left and right of the political spectrum.  As a result, 
although there might be some degree of common grievance with Brussels, states 
governed by parties of the Left will have different interests than those governed by the 
Right, with different and often conflicting issue-linkages.  Moreover, as already 
noted, Land level coalitions cannot operate independently of the Federal level.  Even 
within the demos constraining dimension of German federalism, the party system at 
the Federal level remains an independent variable.  The federal dimension may 
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constrain the central demos, and has provided the platform for political agents to 
pursue polis-constraining strategies, but it is political agency within the Federal party 
system itself that shapes the polis.  It is to these polis-shaping strategies that the article 
now turns. 
 
 
 
The Federal-level party system and 'polis-shaping' strategies 
 
The changing institutional dynamics of the German party system 
Comparatively speaking, the Federal Republic has been classified as either a 'two-and 
-a- half party system' [Blondel, 1968] or a three party system, with a smaller party 
(normally the liberal FDP) acting as the 'kingmaker' between the two big 'catch-all' 
parties [Kirchheimer, 1966], the SPD and the CDU/CSU.  This triangular relationship 
is re-enforced by the Federal Republic's AMS system.  With exception of a brief 
period of majority CDU/CSU government in the 1950s, Germany's AMS system has 
produced election outcomes which make coalition government a necessity.  AMS also 
produces 'split-ticket' voting, whereby voters divide their allegiance between the first 
(constituency) and second (party list) votes.  Split ticket voting tends to benefit small 
parties like the FDP, Greens, PDS and, to a lesser extent, parties of the far right.  
Because it is relatively proportionate, Germany's system of AMS began to reflect the 
steady deconcentration of the party system itself.  This has reduced the share of the 
vote enjoyed by the SPD and CDU/CSU [Padgett, 1993; Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 
1990/94/98] and further re-enforced the German party system's tendency to produce 
coalition government.  The process of party system deconcentration noted above was 
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aggravated by the impact of German unification in 1990, which has effectively 
grafted on a 'second' party system in the states of the former East Germany, within 
which the PDS is a significant force. 
 
Consequences of party system change on political competition 
The overall effect of party system change on political competition in the Federal 
Republic has been two-fold.  First, it has made the two big 'catch all' parties, the CDU 
and SPD, more vulnerable to political competition within 'their' wing of the party 
system.  For the CDU, this has come not only from the FDP, but also from the far 
right parties.  However, the far right parties have had no practical impact at the 
Federal level because none of them have scaled the Federal Republic's five per cent 
hurdle to electoral representation.  Moreover, even if this was to take place, far right 
parties remain so far beyond the pale that they would never be considered as coalition 
partners. 
 
For the SPD, on the other hand, the effects of party system change have been 
significant.  Over the last twenty years, party system deconcentration, combined with 
the effects of unification, has meant that the SPD has had to face two new political 
competitors, the PDS and the Greens.  Of these, the PDS is only just beginning to 
emerge as a potential major player at the Federal level.  The Greens, on the other 
hand, have posed a significant threat ever since they entered the Bundestag in 1983.  
In the 1980s, the SPD tried to counter the threat from the Greens by both adopting a 
'Janus faced' ideological profile, by reaching out to the Green milieu along the 'post-
materialist' ideological dimension and, at the same time, trying to reassure its core 
blue-collar electorate.  This strategy was only a limited success and, in recent years, 
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the SPD has re-adopted a more centrist political agenda under the rubric of the 'Neue 
Mitte'.  At the same time, the Greens have moderated their ideological profile and 
entered into a national coalition with the SPD in 1998 [Lees, 2000]. 
 
The second effect of party system change has been to undermine the triangular 
dynamic of party competition.  As already noted, from the late 1950s to the early 
1980s the party system was dominated by the two big 'catch-all' parties, with the FDP 
acting as the 'kingmaker' and 'liberal corrective' to its senior partner in coalition 
government.  However, the last twenty years has been characterised by two 'systemic 
junctures' [Lees, 2001b]: one when the Greens entered the Bundestag in 1983 and the 
other with the arrival of the PDS in 1990.  Given that both of these parties are to the 
left of the SPD, the net effect has been to shift the centre of gravity within the party 
system leftwards.  At the same time what had previously been a triangular system of 
political competition now shows signs of re-alignment into a more polarised 'two-
bloc' system, with the CDU/CSU and FDP on the political right and the SPD, Greens, 
and PDS on the Left.  It is too early to say if such a re-alignment is taking place, with 
much depending on the outcome of the 2002 Bundestag elections.  Questions remain 
as to whether the FDP can break out of the right-wing bloc, if the PDS is able to 
consolidate its position, and how the electorate reacts to such a stark choice between 
left and right?  Nevertheless, in theory at least, such a change in the fundamentals of 
party competition has the potential to skew the dynamics of coalition formation within 
the system and, by implication, re-shape the polis. 
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Consequences of party system change on coalition outcomes 
It is unclear, however, what consequences such changes will have for smaller parties 
within the party system or whether it will widen the ideological range of the coalition 
win-set enough to give the more Eurosceptical parties some leverage over the 
European debate.  Under the old triangular party system, the two big 'catch-all' parties 
won the vast majority of votes cast but, in normal circumstances, neither the 
CDU/CSU or the SPD ever won enough seats in the Bundestag to form a majority 
government on its own.  Therefore one or the other was forced to enter into coalition 
with the FDP.  As a result, with the exception of 1957-61 and 1966-69, the FDP was a 
member of all governing coalitions that formed during this period.  Thus the FDP was 
an almost permanent feature of German government and, acting as the 'liberal 
corrective' to its senior partner, moderated each successive coalition's ideological 
position, thus lending continuity and path-dependence to government policy. 
 
In terms of coalition theory, as long as the triangular party system persisted, the FDP 
was the permanent 'median party' or 'Mparty' within the Bundestag.  This meant it 
occupied a position towards the ideological centre of the legislature and no 
ideologically-connected majority coalition could form of which it was not a 
member
12
.  This 'kingmaker' function, however, began to be eroded as a result of the 
two systemic junctures of 1983 and 1990, during which time the three-party system 
expanded to become a five-party system. 
 
Nevertheless, the FDP remained the Mparty – and remained in government - until the 
defeat of the Kohl government in the 1998 Bundestag elections.  The fall of Kohl and 
the election of a new Red-Green coalition was regarded by many observers as a break 
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with the past, not least because – with the absence of the FDP - there was no 
continuity of membership between the outgoing and incoming coalitions.  However, 
as Table 5 (below) demonstrates, in an expanded party system the Mparty remains in 
government, but the political centre has moved to the left and the SPD is the new 
Mparty.  Thus, strictly speaking, the present Red-Green coalition is a centrist one and 
consistent with the established pattern of coalition formation in the Federal Republic. 
 
Table 5:  Bundestag Elections 1983-98.  The Persistence of the 'Mparty' in 
Coalition Government
13
. 
Date of Bundestag Election 
 06/03/83 25/01/87 02/12/90 16/10/94 27/09/98 
Seats in Bundestag 
CDU/CSU 244 223 319 294 245 
FDP 34 46 79 47 44 
SPD 193 186 239 252 298 
Greens 27 42 8 49 47 
PDS --- --- 17 30 35 
Total Seats 498 497 662 672 669 
Minimum Winner 250 249 332 337 335 
Mparty FDP FDP FDP FDP SPD 
Coalition  CDU/CSU
-FDP 
CDU/CSU
-FDP 
CDU/CSU
-FDP 
CDU/CSU
-FDP 
SPD-
Greens 
Degree of Change None None None None Total 
Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1983/1987/1990/1994/1998. 
 
Consequences for polis-shaping Eurosceptic strategies 
The persistence of the Mparty in coalition outcomes in the Federal Republic has 
served to moderate government policy over time.  Up until 1998, this role was 
performed by the FDP but has now passed, at least for the time being, to the SPD.  
Whether the SPD will retain this role or whether it will pass back to the FDP depends 
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on the SPD's performance – and that of the Greens and PDS – in future Bundestag 
elections. 
 
But will either of these outcomes create the conditions for successful polis-shaping 
Eurosceptic strategies?  Moreover, is it more likely that such a strategy will come 
from the political left (the PDS) or from the Right (the CSU)?  As far as the PDS is 
concerned, much depends on its ability to consolidate its position within the 
Bundestag.  Yet even if it where to do so, it is still hard to imagine circumstances in 
which the SPD would need or want to go into coalition with it.  There are two reasons 
for this.  First, the PDS' democratic credentials remain dubious and its ideological 
position on many issues, not just European integration, is anathema to the vast 
majority of Social Democrats and to voters in the former West Germany (who make 
up the bulk of the electorate).  Thus, the SPD may consider the PDS a useful political 
ally within the arena of state politics in the former GDR, but at the Federal level it 
would be much more likely to choose the Greens or the FDP as a coalition partner.  
Second, in the unlikely circumstances of the SPD considering going into coalition 
with the PDS, it would be very much on the SPD's terms.  Coalition negotiations in 
Germany tend to be long, drawn out, and end with the signing of a formal coalition 
agreement.  This is because the stakes are so high.  All parties have to be confident 
that co-operation is possible, not least because of the principle of ministerial 
autonomy (the Ressortsprinzip), which is protected in the Federal Republic's basic 
law.  Given the tendency of parties to staff ministries with their own people, policy 
making can become a vehicle for inter-coalition rivalry.  As a result, the distribution 
of ministerial seats between the parties is central to the coalition bargaining process 
and, once a formal agreement has been signed, it is hard to rectify mistakes.  During 
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negotiations, policy-specific sub-committees become the key gate-keepers within the 
process: not just in terms of the allocation of specific portfolios but also in setting the 
parameters of policy areas and the terms of reference between them.  Under these 
circumstances, there would be no 'ad hoc-erry' on the SPD's part: it would make sure 
that the PDS was kept on a short leash.  Like the Greens before them, the PDS would 
have to moderate its stance or remain in opposition.  This would leave little scope for 
anything other than the 'softest' of Eurosceptical agendas. 
 
For the CSU, the outlook is not much more positive.  Where the CSU does enjoy an 
advantage over the PDS is that it is accepted as a mainstream party and therefore does 
not have to moderate its position unduly to enter into government.  Nevertheless, in an 
expanded party system, the CSU finds itself numerically less significant and further 
from the political centre in ideological terms.  As a result, its leverage within the 
system has been reduced.  Moreover, it does not matter if the FDP or the SPD is the 
Mparty, as neither outcome enhances the CSU's reduced leverage.  The current 
situation with the SPD as Mparty thoroughly marginalises the CSU as a Federal 
player.  But even if the FDP were Mparty any coalition outcome involving the FDP 
would be a return to the status quo ante, with the centre privileged over the right-
wing.  In fact, the only set of circumstances in which the CSU would be in a stronger 
position is one of political meltdown on the centre-left, in which the FDP failed to 
enter the Bundestag, the SPD was severely weakened and the CDU became Mparty.  
It is hard to imagine such circumstances taking place. 
 
To sum up, at first glance the German party system's system of proportional 
representation and pattern of coalition government would appear to offer 
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opportunities for small parties pursuing a polis-shaping strategy of Euroscepticism.  
After all, in other proportional systems such as Israel, small parties with relatively 
extreme agendas have been quite successful in skewing the terms of political debate 
in a way disproportional to their size and electoral impact.  However, for the reasons 
noted in this section of the article, this is not the case in the Federal Republic.  Since 
the foundation of the Federal Republic, the pattern of party competition and coalition 
outcomes has been one that privileges the political centre.  As a result, the party with 
the median legislator, the Mparty, has nearly always been in government.  Up until 
1998 the FDP was the Mparty, despite the breakdown of the old triangular system of 
political competition and the expansion of the party system from three to five parties.  
However, even with the election of Gerhard Schröder's Red-Green coalition in 1998, 
the principle of centrality remains as the SPD is now the Mparty.  Thus, for the 
foreseeable future, the centre of the party system (as signified by the Mparty) is going 
to be either the FDP or SPD.  Given that both parties are, with some exceptions, pro-
European in outlook, any coalition outcome that involves them will adopt a consensus 
position on European issues.  Therefore, one must conclude that the German party 
system provides a poor institutional setting for polis-shaping Eurosceptic strategies. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article is built on four propositions.  First, that there is a latent potential within 
the German polity for the mobilisation of what remains a significant level of popular 
unease about aspects of the ongoing process of European integration.  Second, that at 
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present this potential is unfulfilled and, as a result, Euroscepticism remains the 'dark 
matter' of German politics.  Third, that the absence of a clearly stated Eurosceptical 
agenda is not due to the inherent 'enlightenment' of the German political class about 
the European project, but rather is the result of systemic disincentives shaping the 
preferences of rational acting politicians.  Finally, that these systemic disincentives 
are to be found in the institutions of the German polity. 
 
In order to demonstrate these four propositions, the article adapts Taggart and 
Szczerbiak's dichotomy between 'hard' and 'soft' Euroscepticism.  The article then 
goes on to make a distinction between sustained agendas, and those agendas that are 
used as a heresthetic.  But agendas are of little significance without a strategy for 
promoting them.  Therefore, the article builds on Stepan's 'demos constraining-demos 
enabling' continuum and posits the idea of two types of strategies – 'polis-
constraining' and 'polis-shaping'.  The choice of such a strategy depends on the nature 
of the institutional settings within which agents operate. 
 
Armed with the distinction between narratives, agendas and strategies (and the six 
categories that go with it), the article then assesses the potential and real levels of 
political opportunity inherent in the German system of federalism and the Federal 
party system.  The article demonstrates that the institutions of the German polity do 
not provide fertile ground for the successful mobilisation of anything but the softest 
Eurosceptical narratives (whilst hard Euroscepticism has no purchase at all within the 
German polity).  German federalism has provided the institutional setting for a 
number of Eurosceptic 'turns', but these are to be found either at the political fringe 
(the PDS), limited to a party faction (within the CSU state party), or have been more 
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ephemeral heresthetics (the SPD in Baden-Württemberg, the CDU in Saxony).  Taken 
together, they indicate that the federal dimension has been a moderately successful 
platform for polis-constraining strategies of soft Euroscepticism.  As for polis-shaping 
strategies, the logic of party competition and coalition formation means that the 
German party system – at the Federal level at least – is not a happy hunting ground 
for Eurosceptics. 
 
The article is intended to be an exploratory analysis of the impact of institutional 
settings on party based Euroscepticism in Germany.  There is much scope for further 
comparative research into this impact across space (cross-country comparisons) and 
time (the iterative impact of institutions, as well as that of institutional change).  
Nevertheless, the article is what one could call the 'first cut' [Allison and Zelikow, 
1999], and it demonstrates that the institutional configuration of the German polity 
makes political mobilisation of the population's unease over aspects of European 
integration an unattractive prospect.  This being the case, it is highly unlikely that the 
political class will ever be split over Europe in quite the way that has taken place 
elsewhere.  As a result, the Federal Republic will almost definitely continue on its 
current course as the pace-setter of European integration, and German Euroscepticism 
will remain the 'dark matter' of German politics. 
 
Notes 
                                                          
1
 I would like to thank Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, Leonard Ray, Paul Taggart, William Paterson, and 
three anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions that improved this paper. 
2
 this was noted by the European Commission as early as the mid-1990s. See A View from the Top: Top 
Decision Makers and the European Union (Brussels, 1996); see also Page, B. I. and Barabas, J., 
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'Foreign policy gaps between citizens and leaders', International Studies Quarterly No.44 (2000): 339-
64. 
3
 see Checkel, J. T. and Moravcsik, A. 'A Constructivist Research Programme in EU Studies?', 
European Union Politics Vol.2, 2 (2001): 219-49; also Weingast, B. R. 'Political Institutions: Rational 
Choice Perspectives', and Peters, B.G. 'Political Institutions: Old and New', both in Goodin, R. E. and 
Klingemann, H-D. (eds.), 1998: A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford University Press. 
4
 see Szczerbiak, 2001; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Marks and Hooghe, 1999; Henderson, 1999; Taggart, 
1998; Hix and Lord, 1997. 
5
 like all Green parties, the German Greens have been sceptical of some aspects of European 
integration.  However, in recent years the party - and Joschka Fischer in particular -  has adopted a 
strikingly pro-European stance.  For this reason, I have placed the Greens in the pro-European 
category. 
6
 the CDU and CSU are members of a joint Parliamentary faction in the Bundestag and are, therefore, 
effectively a single party at the Federal level. 
7
 the PDS rejects key elements of the integration process, including Economic and Monetary Union, 
but are in favour of membership of the EU.  This raises problems about where to place them within the 
typology.  It is the author's judgement that they must be classified as a 'soft', rather than a 'hard', 
Eurosceptic party.  However, others might argue that there is a significant level of 'hard' 
Euroscepticism in the five new states of the former East Germany, and that the PDS does mobilise 
around this.  Such an interpretation would place the PDS in the category of 'hard' Euroscepticism. 
8
 this tactic was used particularly effectively by the SPD, under the leadership of Oskar Lafontaine, in 
the last years of the previous Kohl administration in the mid-1990s and, to a lesser extent, by the 
CDU/CSU at present. 
9
 in the past, the SPD has taken an equally hard line with the Greens when negotiating coalitions at the 
Land level.  For instance, in 1989 the Berlin SPD forced the fundi-dominated Alternative Liste to 
moderate its stance on NATO and the allied presence in the city before agreeing to enter into coalition 
with it [Lees, C., 2000]. 
10
 it is interesting to note that in late 2001, the European ministers of the states of Bavaria and Saxony 
9governed by the CSU and CDU respectively), and North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony 
(governed by the SPD) agreed to neglect the Euro issue in the 2002 Bundestag election campaign.  The 
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thinking behind this decision was that raising the issue salience of 'Europe' only served to benefit the 
far right and PDS. 
11
 see Teilungsfolgen. Materialsammlung zum Streit um staatliche Beihilfe an die Volkswagen AG für 
ein Investitionsvorhaben im Freistaat Sachsen. Dresden, Sächsiches Staatskanzlei, 1996. 
12
 in his 'Coalition Theories And Cabinet Formation' (Elsevier, 1973), Abram de Swaan constructed 
what he called the 'closed minimum range' of Cabinet formation. De Swaan's theory predicts that the 
winning set will comprise the minimal connected winning coalition with the smallest ideological range. 
This range is mapped along a single Downsian Left-Right axis, running from progressivism to 
conservatism and all parties are assumed to have preference orderings of all potential coalitions, based 
upon their relative proximities to the median or 'Mparty' (of both a given coalition and within the 
legislature as a whole).  De Swaan's theory is often referred to as the 'median legislator' or 'median 
party' model because it is based on the assumption that the party that controls the median legislator in 
any potential coalition is decisive because it blocks the axis along which any connected winning 
coalition must form. 
13
 Table adapted from Lees, C., 'Coalitions – beyond the politics of centrality?' in Padgett, S. and 
Poguntke, T. (eds.), 2001: Continuity and Change in German Politics: Beyond the Politics of 
Centrality? A Festschrift for Gordon Smith.  Frank Cass. 
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